This paper quantifies the welfare impact of unilateral trade liberalization and computes the optimal tariff structure for Costa Rica in the presence of trade-policy-induced international capital flows and foreign capital taxation. For this, an applied general equilibrium model integrating trade, capital flows and international capital income taxation is used. The model has been calibrated to a 1990-91 data set for the economies of Costa Rica and a group of OECD countries. In the model, foreign capital income is taxed by host countries and the tax-credit system operates in foreign investors home countries. Results for Costa Rica show that complete trade liberalization ends up being welfare-reducing, as it leads to an outflow of capital and loss of tax revenue which more than offset the efficiency gains from an enhanced resource allocation.
Introduction
This paper uses a calibrated general equilibrium model to quantify the welfare e®ect of trade liberalization and compute the optimal tari® structure in a small economy (Costa Rica) when trade-policy-induced international capital°ows and foreign capital taxation are present.
A well-known result from the \tari®-jumping" investment literature of the 1970s is that import-tari®-induced capital in°ows will be immiserizing for a small open economy (e.g. Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro, 1977) . It is also known that this result relies crucially on the assumption that the host economy does not tax foreign capital (Bhagwati, 1973) . As Bond (1991) has shown, if this assumption is lifted and taxes paid in the host country by foreign companies are credited in the source country against the corresponding domestic tax liability, tari®-induced capital in°ows are no longer immiserizing. The reason for this is that in this case foreign capital brings with it tax revenue that would otherwise go to the capital-exporting country. Therefore, to capture this revenue and increase national income, it will be optimal for a small economy to impose a tari® on its imports|provided that the importable sector uses capital intensively
The possibility of import tari®s being welfare-enhancing for a small economy may have some policy implications for many developing countries which have embarked on outward-oriented growth strategies in the last¯fteen years or so. First, unilateral trade liberalization and foreign direct investment¯gure prominently in most LDCs' \new" growth strategies. Second, in many developing countries trade liberalization 1 has implied a lower tari® protection for the manufacturing sector (relative to others), which tends to be relatively capital-intensive. This, as the Stolper-Samuelson theorem suggests, will tend to reduce the return to capital and thereby FDI in°ows to these countries. Third, the bulk of FDI in developing countries originates in developed countries, the majority of which uses the tax credit mechanism when taxing foreign source income.
1 In this context, unilateral trade liberalization could deteriorate national welfare. Whether it does or not is an empirical question|which would depend on the relative strength of the positive e®ect of lower distortions resulting from freer trade, and the negative e®ect associated with the loss of tax revenue and income following lower FDI in°ows.
Although a lot of work has been devoted to the theoretical link between import tari®s and international capital°ows (see e.g. Wong, 1996) , model-based empirical work endogenously linking capital°ows to tari® changes in a general equilibrium setting|whether with foreign capital taxation or not| is quite scant. In fact, the only calibrated study that appears to have addressed this linkage is Goulder and Eichengreen (1992) . 2 However, they focused exclusively on portfolio investment, without 1 As of 1991, 15 out of 24 OECD countries o®ered their companies credits for taxes paid in countries with which a treaty to avoid double taxation was not in e®ect (see OECD, 1991) .
2 Some applied general equilibrium models seeking to quantify the e®ects of the North American Free Agreement (NAFTA) explored the likely impact of incorporating FDI°ows, but did so in an ad-hoc, exogenous fashion. See Brown (1992) ; Francois and Shiells (1994) . Damus et al. (1991) have studied the implications of the existence of tax credits for Canada but in a corporate tax reform context.
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considering FDI. They do not consider international capital income taxation either.
In this paper we quantify the welfare impact of unilateral trade liberalization in a small economy (Costa Rica) once FDI-°ow responses are taken into account and taxation of FDI is allowed for. For this, a multisectoral applied general equilibrium model integrating trade, capital°ows and international capital income taxation is used. The model has been calibrated to a 1990-91 data for Costa Rica and a group of OECD countries (those using the credit mechanism when taxing foreign source income), and is also used to compute Costa Rica's optimal tari® structure. We show that, with foreign capital taxation and the tax credit system in force, free trade is no longer¯rst-best for the Costa Rican economy. We¯nd that the optimal tari® structure for this economy would consist of a combination of relatively low import tari®s and subsidies.
The paper is organized as follows. The next Section brie°y discusses the relationship between import tari®s, capital°ows and welfare with and without tax credits.
Section 3 describes recent trade liberalization and FDI policy in Costa Rica. Section 4 presents our model, while Section 5 discusses the nature of the data used for its implementation. Section 6 analyses simulation results, and Section 7 summarizes and concludes.
Tari®s, Capital Flows and Welfare
The relationship between unilateral tari® changes and international capital movements has been analyzed in great detail in the theoretical international trade literature (see, e.g. Mundell, 1957; Jones, 1967; Wong, 1995 to the equalization of factor prices, which eliminates the rationale for factor movements. Hence free trade is a perfect substitute for factor movements. On the other hand, if factors move from where they are abundant to where they are scarce, the bases for trade are reduced, or disappear. Hence factor movements are a substitute for trade (Ru±n, 1984) .
The interaction between tari® changes and capital movements was¯rst formally presented by Mundell (1957) . In a two-sector, two-factor model, invoking the StolperSamuelson theorem, Mundell shows that when a tari® is imposed by the laborabundant country the return to capital is increased, and capital moves there; with perfect capital mobility, trade eventually disappears. This type of analysis later gave rise to the literature on \tari®-jumping" investment and its welfare consequences for a small open economy. The main conclusion of this literature was that the combination of capital in°ows and distortionary tari® barriers in a small economy would result in immiserizing growth. The idea had been suggested in Johnson (1967) and Bhagwati (1973) , and it was further developed by Minabe (1974) , and Brecher and Diaz-Alejandro (1977) in a two-good, two-factor framework. It was generalized by Jones (1984) , and especially by Neary and Ruane (1988) . The second two authors lifted the restriction on the number of goods and factors, and extended the main result to the case in which capital in°ows are entirely endogenous.
In all these models, however, the result of distortionary tari® changes leading to immiserizing capital in°ows relies crucially on foreign capital not being taxed by the host country. Bond (1991) presents a general equilibrium model with foreign capital taxation and two goods|one of which is imported|for small economy (\small" both in goods and capital markets). With the importable good being capital-intensive, Bond shows that if the credit mechanism is present in foreign investors' home country, the optimal import tari® for a small, host economy is positive. With the credit mechanisms present in the capital-exporting country, by taxing foreign capital income, the host country extract a gain in terms of tax revenue that would otherwise be captured by the home country, thus increasing national income and welfare. As Bond indicates, by bringing with it tax revenue, foreign capital generates a kind of (positive) scal externality in the host country. Therefore, a subsidy on foreign capital is called for, and this can be granted in the form of an import tari®.
The argument, as presented by Bond, runs as follows. For the host to capture all of the tax revenue associated with foreign capital income, its tax rate must be set at a level equal to that in the capital-exporting country. This, however, gives rise to a divergence between private and social cost of capital, i.e. the gross and the net rate of return, respectively. The latter is indeed the return required by foreign capitalists, which in equilibrium must be the same in the host and home country. Therefore, the optimal policy for the host consists of subsidizing foreign capital at a rate equal to the income tax rate. As Bond (p. 321) puts it, \essentially, the home country wants to pay the taxes for the owners of imported capital and to impose no distortions in the goods market."
In practice, however, it might not be feasible for a country to subsidize foreign capital in such a direct way. On the other hand, as pointed out by Bond, some capitalexporting countries (such as the USA) do not grant credits for taxes that have actually not been paid. Under these circumstances, it might be easier and more e®ective for a capital-importing country to resort to an indirect form of subsidization, such as an import tari®|provided, of course, that foreign capital locates in the importcompeting sector. As the tari® will distort consumption decisions, it will be an inferior option to the direct subsidy|but still superior to free trade. In Section 6 we compare the performance of the direct subsidy vis-µ a-vis that of the optimal tari®.
Recent Trade and Foreign Investment Policy in Costa Rica
Like the rest of Central American countries, ever since the creation of the Central American Common Market (CACM) in 1960, Costa Rica followed a growth strategy based on industrialization through import substitution, especially of consumer goods.
In trade policy terms, this strategy demanded the imposition of high tari® rates for consumer goods, on the one hand, and of low import taxes for intermediates and capital goods, on the other. Tari® protection for import substitutes during this period was thus characterized by a somewhat high average level and dispersion (First column of Table 1 ).
In the mid-1980s, in the context of broader policy reforms, the strategy of import substitution was partially abandoned, as the country embarked on more open trade 6 Source: Calculations based on SIECA (1993) and WTO (1995) .
policies, intending to foster growth mainly through export expansion. Since then, but specially since 1990|the year that Costa Rica acceded to GATT|all import quantitative restrictions and regulations|except those having to do with security, health and environmental considerations|have been eliminated, while tari® rates have been substantially reduced, especially for consumer goods of industrial origin ( Table 1) . As a result, both the level of protection and its dispersion have been substantially lowered.
Simultaneously to this unilateral trade liberalization, Costa Rica has also em- Unlike many developing countries' foreign investment regime (see, e.g., UNCTAD, 1993), the Costa Rican FDI regime does not contain incentives available only to foreign investors. Some export promotion schemes bene¯t to a large extent foreign companies but they are also available to domestic¯rms. This is the case of duty-free trade zones and other very similar schemes presently being implemented in Costa Rica. They o®er¯rms not only tari® exemptions for goods used in production but 9 also generous tax holidays. Tax incentives for¯rms operating in duty-free trade zones in Costa Rica consist of full income tax exemption for 10-12 years, and 50 percent exemption for the following 4-6 years (WTO, 1995) . 4 They also provide full exemption on taxes on capital and assets for an inde¯nite period of time. Though the main objective of these schemes is export promotion,¯rms operating in duty-free zones are allowed to sell up to 40 percent of their output in the domestic market (WTO, 1995) .
The next Section describes the model used to simulate the e®ects of unilateral trade liberalization on welfare in Costa Rica, once FDI responses and international capital income taxation are taken into consideration.
The Model

Production
There are two countries, 5 A and B, each producing n goods (n>1), some of which (at least) are tradeables. Production in each country requires a¯xed-proportion combination of value added and intermediate inputs (henceforth superscripts denote 4 The fact that many developed countries use the credit mechanism when taxing foreign source income often makes these income tax incentives largely ine®ective when their bene¯ciaries are foreign companies.
5 In the empirical implementation of the model we consider in fact three \countries," including a \Rest of the World." To keep notation as simple as possible and avoid repetition, throughout this section we abstract from this third region.
countries, and they refer to A and B unless otherwise indicated; for convenience, subscripts to index sectors are omitted):
where X i is gross output, Q i is value added and Z i represents intermediate inputs.
Intermediate inputs, in turn, are also required in a¯xed proportion:
where Á i denotes the¯xed amount of intermediate goods required to produce a unit of output.
Value added requires the use of two primary inputs, labor and capital, L and K, whose supply is assumed to be¯xed. These primary inputs are combined according to a constant elasticity of substitution (CES) function:
where Q i denote value added,°i is a shift parameter, ® i a share parameters and ¾ i re°ects the elasticity of substitution between labor and capital in each country
Furthermore, it is assumed that labor is internationally immobile while capital can move freely across countries. Capital used in production in each country is an aggregate of domestic capital (K 
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of cross-hauling in international capital°ows, re°ected by balance of payments data.
The corresponding aggregate capital function is given by
where ± i are share parameters and ½ i re°ects the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign capital in each country (elasticity,
We assume that both countries tax their capital on a world-wide basis and give a tax credit for taxes paid abroad. The maximum amount of tax credit is the corresponding home country tax liability. Countries are assumed to apply the same tax rate to foreign source and domestically generated income. We denote these rates by ¿ A and ¿ B and assume that ¿ A > ¿ B . Taxation in each country does not discriminate between income from foreign capital and income from domestic capital generated internally. In each country, the rate of return is in principle di®erent for domestic and foreign capital.
The equilibrium conditions for factor demand are as follows:
For labor,
where ! i represent the wage rate.
For foreign capital and domestic capital, respectively, Wang and Pereira, 1994) . In a dynamic setting, Bovenberg (1986) also uses an speci¯cation like this for investment goods. Equilibrium in the international allocation of capital requires that capital of a given nationality earns the same net return regardless of where is used (domestically or abroad). That is,
We also assume that there is perfect competition both in goods and factor markets.
In the latter, the assumption of full employment is also made.
Consumption and Trade
Imported and domestic goods, M i and D i , respectively, are assumed to be imperfect substitutes for each other. Traded goods consumed in each country are a composite,
The corresponding CES aggregation function is given by
where Ã i is a share parameter and´i re°ects the elasticities of substitution between domestic and imported goods (elasticity,
Similarly, for exports we use a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function. Thus, the technology that transforms output for the domestic market into output for the export market is described by
where D i and E i are output produced for the domestic and export market, respectively,¯i is a distribution parameter and µ i re°ects the elasticity of transformation
Countries levy tari®s on their imports at rates t i . Thus, the domestic price of imports inclusive of tari®s is
where P w m is the world price of imports.
Income
It is assumed that revenue from income and trade taxes is returned to consumers in a lump-sum fashion. Thus, assuming also that pro¯ts from foreign capital are fully repatriated to the home country once the corresponding domestic income taxes have been paid, augmented income for country A is given by (that for B follows by symmetry)
where the r 
Market Clearing Conditions
Equilibrium in the goods market requires
In the factor market, the clearing conditions are
where L i s is the exogenous labor supply in each country.
Data and Parameter Calibration
The model described above has been calibrated to a 1990-91 data set on production, trade and foreign direct investment for the economies of Costa Rica and a group of OECD countries. The latter is made up of those countries which, as of 1991, o®ered credits for taxes paid by their foreign investors in countries with which they did not have an agreement to avoid international double taxation of capital income. 7 This suits also the case of Costa Rica, who, as of 1994, had not signed a treaty like that with any of the OECD countries included in our group, except Germany (who, in any case, uses the crediting mechanism with treaty-countries also). These group of countries is responsible for more than 80 percent of FDI in Costa Rica. As mentioned earlier, the empirical implementation of the model also includes a \Rest of the World."
OECD countries which do not use the credit mechanism are included in the Rest of the World, together with developing countries. , 1994, vol. 4) .
Production data, including input-output°ows, for the group of OECD countries comes from OECD (1995) , and is based on data for Canada, Germany, Japan, the in the economy were generated by foreign a±liates; while in Mexico, in 1986|when the Mexican foreign investment regime was still very restrictive|more than half of all assets were controlled by foreign a±liates (UNCTAD, 1994, Vol. 4, Table 9 ). ¤ Ratio of tari® revenue to imports. This column is quite di®erent from those in Table   1 both because it corresponds to a di®erent year (1991) and because takes into account exemptions and the existence of free trade within the CACM.
n.a. = not applicable by the coverage of the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) program in each sector. 10 For completeness, Table 3 presents some base data for the group of OECD countries.
Regarding elasticities, the trade elasticity values we use are based on those that have recently been used in the literature (see, e.g. Hinojosa-Ojeda and Robinson, 1991; Perroni and Wigle, 1994) . We use a lower elasticity value for primary goods as these tend to be more homogeneous across countries than, for instance, manufacturing goods. To take account of country size, smaller elasticities are used for Costa Rica.
The values we use are: 1.25 for primary goods and 1.75 for other goods, for Costa Rica; and 2.0 and 2.5, respectively, for the group of OECD countries. As to inputsubstitution in value added, we use a Cobb-Douglas speci¯cation. The elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign capital, in turn, has been assumed to be 1.25 and 2.0 in Costa Rica and the group of OECD countries, respectively, in all sectors. We carry out sensitivity analysis on the values of trade and capital substitution elasticities. Finally, shift and share parameters are obtained through calibration.
Simulation Results
We have used the model and data described above to quantify the welfare gains, or losses, to the economy of Costa Rica from completely eliminating import tari®s. We also compute the optimal tari® structure for this economy in the presence of taxation Table 4 . Table 2 ). The intuition for capital leaving the country is provided by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem. Since in Costa Rica import-tari® protection is higher for manufacturing activities (Table 2) , its elimination tends generally to contract these activities. Given that in this economy manufacturing activities tend to be intensive users of capital relative to others, its contraction reduces the demand for capital, making this factor's return fall.
With foreign capital being taxed, the out°ow of capital produced by complete tari® elimination causes welfare to fall by about 0.05 per cent. This results from lower income tax revenue and national income. The small size of the welfare decline suggests that the optimal tari® structure is not very di®erent from free trade|and in fact this turns out to be the case (Table 4) . Under the optimal tari® structure with foreign capital taxation, agricultural imports would be subsidized whereas those of manufacturing goods would be generally subject to a tari®. Optimal tari®s tend to 21 Non-tradeables n.a.
n.a. = not applicable be higher in those sectors using capital more intensively, and which have a larger FDI share (metal products and other manufacturing, especially).
The low level of the optimal subsidy and tari® is basically driven by the relatively modest role played by foreign capital in the Costa Rican economy (Table 2) . Of some signi¯cance is also the fact that trade intervention distorts consumption patterns as well. Substitution elasticities also play a role, though this is not very important in absolute terms (Tables 5 and 6 ). Furthermore, the pattern of results across sectors remains basically unchanged as elasticity values are varied. Higher trade elasticities imply that trade liberalization has a stronger impact on goods relative prices and thereby on relative factor returns. This leads to free trade causing a larger out°ow of capital, which, in turn, generates higher welfare losses when foreign capital is taxed (Table 5 ). The dispersion of incentives associated with the optimal tari®s is now slightly greater. With a higher degree of substitution between foreign and domestic capital (the corresponding elasticities are now equal to 2.0 for Costa Rica), the capitalout°ow e®ect of trade liberalization is also strengthened (Table 6 ). Accordingly, the negative welfare impact under foreign capital taxation is magni¯ed. The level of both the optimal tari® and subsidy increases.
We have also computed the welfare gains for Costa Rica from directly subsidizing capital (the¯rst-best policy) instead of using import tari®s/subsidies. Results (for the central case speci¯cation) show that this would increase welfare by only 0.02 percent in comparison with the optimal tari® scenario. This modest gain is not surprising given that the optimal-tari® level across sectors is quite small and does not present a great deal of dispersion (Table 4) . Increasing the tax on foreign capital 23 for countries using the credit mechanism) would generate greater welfare gains (three times as much) than a switch to a direct subsidy. In a more desaggregated model, this number should be smaller, as our calculation does not take into consideration the fact that companies from countries with a tax rate lower than the OECD average will¯nd themselves with non-refundable excess credits and might therefore prefer to locate in a di®erent country. Despite this, a greater tax rate on foreign capital income might still be a superior option to the direct subsidy and seems to be more feasible as well.
Summary and Conclusion
This paper has used a calibrated general equilibrium model to quantify the welfare impact of trade liberalization and compute the optimal tari® structure for Costa Rica in the presence of trade-policy-induced capital°ows and foreign capital taxation. Wē nd that with foreign capital being taxed and the tax credit system in force, the complete elimination of import tari®s hurts Costa Rica. This to the extent that tari® removal leads to an out°ow of capital and a loss of tax revenue that more than o®set the positive traditional reallocation e®ect of moving to free trade. Thus, the optimal tari® structure for the Costa Rican economy does not consist of zero-import tari®s, but rather of a mixture of positive import tari®s and subsidies. The optimal tari® and subsidy levels are, however, quite low, re°ecting basically the fact that the role of foreign capital in this economy is relatively modest. It would be interesting to examine how results change in an economy in which foreign investment plays a substantially more signi¯cant role.
Given the relatively small level of optimal tari®s/subsidies, and the fact that there seems to exist some costs associated with non-uniform-tari® structures (such as rent-seeking-related costs, for instance), our¯nding cannot be taken as providing a strong case against free trade in an economy such as the Costa Rican. Also, it must be bear in mind that the (static) nature of our model is unable to capture dynamic gains often associated with trade (Stokey, 1991; Young, 1991) . At the same time, it should be noted that even if we restrict our analysis to the static cost and bene¯ts of freer trade, trade liberalization typically does not consist of a complete tari® elimination, but rather of a reduction in the level of protection and its dispersion.
Therefore, even in the presence of foreign capital taxation, trade liberalization, as usually practiced, could still yield static welfare gains for a small open economy.
Our numerical simulations imply, however, that allowing for capital°ows and their taxation might reduce the size of static gains from non-full trade liberalization.
